The 1988 mlolongo voting in Kakamega marked a low point in Kenya’s democratic history. Known as the queue voting system, mlolongo replaced the secret ballot with open-air lines behind candidates’ portraits. The system was ripe for abuse—and the Kakamega region became a prime case study in how political manipulation undermined electoral legitimacy under President Daniel arap Moi’s one-party regime.
This controversial electoral method allowed the state to tighten its grip on power while silencing dissent and disqualifying potential opposition figures.
What Was Mlolongo Voting?
Mlolongo, meaning “queue” in Kiswahili, was introduced under the guise of speeding up elections. Voters physically stood in line behind the photograph of their preferred candidate. However, the method eliminated voter secrecy, making intimidation, coercion, and fraud nearly inevitable.
Introduced for the KANU party primaries in 1988, mlolongo was a litmus test of loyalty. In places like Kakamega, the system was abused to rig out popular but independent-minded candidates and promote those loyal to Moi’s administration.
Political Engineering in Kakamega
Kakamega was not spared the brunt of this manipulation. The region, traditionally politically active and ethnically diverse, saw sweeping changes:
- Martin Shikuku, the fearless MP for Butere and longtime opposition voice, was rigged out despite grassroots support. His absence from Parliament marked a blow to political pluralism in Western Kenya.
- Burudi Nabwera, once KANU Secretary-General, was “elected” in Lugari at the nomination stage, with no general election required.
- Moses Mudavadi, then Minister for Local Government and a Moi loyalist, was returned unopposed in Sabatia—a clear sign of central favor.
These outcomes reflected a top-down orchestration, where electoral competition was replaced by strategic endorsements and eliminations.
Ethnic Balancing and Redistricting
In anticipation of mlolongo chaos, boundary redistribution was carried out. Kakamega gained three new constituencies:
- Vihiga (from Sabatia),
- Lurambi North and South were split into Lurambi and Shinyalu,
- Ikolomani was subdivided to adjust voter balance.
The redistricting, while framed as administrative modernization, was used to dilute opposition strongholds and ensure that pro-KANU candidates won with little resistance.
Mlolongo thus worked hand-in-glove with constituency gerrymandering to undermine real representation in Kakamega.
The Role of State Power and Intimidation
Public servants, teachers, chiefs, and KANU functionaries were mobilized to enforce loyalty. Citizens who failed to join the “correct” queue risked victimization, transfers, or economic exclusion. In a region where agriculture and civil service jobs were dominant, such risks held weight.
In Kakamega, mlolongo institutionalized fear. Dissent was no longer merely unpopular—it became dangerous.
Suppressed Voices and Lost Momentum
The sidelining of Shikuku, who had survived detention and openly criticized Moi, reflected the regime’s intolerance of dissent. Other sidelined figures included:
- Bahati Semo, a popular figure in Vihiga, whose “unopposed” win was less grassroots and more choreographed,
- Jesse Opembe, Shikuku’s controversial replacement, who later died under unclear circumstances.
These shifts created a generation of silenced political actors, disrupting Kakamega’s political dynamism for years to come.
Conclusion
The 1988 mlolongo voting in Kakamega was not just a technical electoral change—it was a weaponized system of political manipulation. It rewarded loyalty over service, and obedience over popularity. For residents of Kakamega, it marked the erosion of democratic choice under one-party rule and signaled the deepening of autocracy in Kenya.
The consequences would linger, shaping the region’s political realignments in the multiparty 1990s and leaving behind a cautionary tale of how state machinery can be turned against its own people in the name of “efficiency.”
